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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The Amici adopt the Statement of the Issues contained in the Brief of the
Appellants. This Brief will address solely the first issue in that Statement.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Virtually all of us will at one time or another require medical care, whether
we intend to or not. Thus, everyone is a participant in the health care market. The
decision that we make as to how we will pay for the health care we will inevitably
need-- i.e. whether to purchase health insurance or postpone payment to the future
-- has enormous implications on the national economy. Section 1501 of the
Affordable Care Act, which requires all who can it afford it to purchase a
minimum level of health insurance or pay a penalty to the U.S. Treasury, is a
measured and economically appropriate means of addressing the problems facing
the health care market.
That market is characterized by five unique factors that are not present in
other markets: the unavoidable need for medical care, the unpredictability of such
need, the high cost of care, the inability of providers to refuse to provide care in
emergency situations, and the very significant cost-shifting that underlies the way
medical care is paid for in this country. Because of the high costs of medical care
and the unpredictability of when we will need it, insurance is the way we typically
pay for health care. In enacting Section 1501, Congress recognized these facts and
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2sought to spread health care costs among those that need, or will need, medical
care.
The decision to forego insurance is not “inactivity,” as the Court below
believed, but an economic decision as to how individuals will pay for their
inevitable need for health care -- i.e. their decision to purchase health insurance or
put payment off to the future. That decision, which studies demonstrate is
typically not inadvertent but made on a reasoned and conscious basis, has
enormous implications for the national economy. Consequently, the decision to
forego purchasing health insurance is not several steps removed from interstate
commerce, as the Court below found, but directly and immediately affects an
industry that represents more than sixteen percent of our gross domestic product.
The Section lies well within established precedent under the Commerce and
Necessary and Proper Clauses.
Further, upholding Congress’ power to adopt Section 1501 will not vitiate
the Constitutional framework of a federal government of limited delegated powers
or usurp the police powers of the States. The economics of the health care market
are unique, and the economics of none of the other markets discussed by the Court
below or by the Appellees is characterized by the sharing of costs that
characterizes the health care market. Section 1501 is a tailored response to a
distinct market imperfection that does not exist in other markets. Affirming
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3Congress’ power to act here will not open the floodgates and empower Congress to
require individuals to purchase or use goods and services because Congress
concludes it is good for them.
INTRODUCTION
The Amici Curiae submit this brief 3 in support of the Government and urge
the Court to reverse the decision of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Florida4 finding that Section 1501 of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (“ACA” or “Act”) exceeded Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause.5 That Section requires, with certain exceptions, that all
Americans who can afford a minimum level of health insurance either purchase
such coverage or pay a penalty to the United States Treasury.
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici Curiae are professors and scholars in economics who have taught,
studied, and researched the economic forces operating in and affecting the health
care and health insurance markets. The Economic Scholars include internationally
3 Counsel for Appellants and for both the States, and for NFIB and the individual
Appellees, have consented to Amici filing this brief. No counsel for any party
authored this brief in whole or in part, nor did any party, person, or entity other
than Amici and its counsel, make a monetary contribution to the preparation and
submission of this brief. See Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5).
4 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., --- F. Supp. 2d ---,
2011 WL 285683, No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).
5 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
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4recognized scholars in economics, including three Nobel laureates,6 two recipients
of the John Bates Clark Medal for the outstanding American economist aged 40
and under,7 and former high-ranking economists in a number of former
administrations. The Amici believe that reform of the health care system is
essential to constraining the growth of health care spending and that broadly-based
insurance coverage is essential to any reform of the health care system in this
country.
This brief describes the unique economics of the health care industry and
explains why there is no such thing as “inactivity” or non-participation in the
health care market.8 Virtually all Americans will, at some time during their life,
require health care, either because of illness, accident, or the wear and tear of age.
Given the extremely high costs of health care for all but the most routine
treatments and procedures, the cost of medical care is beyond the means of all but
the most wealthy Americans. Insurance is the means by which we pay for our
6 The Nobel Laureates are Dr. Kenneth Arrow (1972), Dr. George Akerlof (2001),
and Dr. Eric Maskin (2007).
7 The winners of the John Bates Clark Medal are Dr. Susan Athey (2007) and Dr.
Matthew Rabin (2001).
8 Amici have filed this brief with appropriate modifications for the applicable facts
in the following other cases challenging the constitutionality of Section 1501:
Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010),
appeal docketed, Nos. 11-1057 & 11-1058 (4th Cir. Jan. 20, 2011); Thomas More
Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010), appeal docketed,
No. 10-2388 (6th Cir. Oct. 25, 2010); Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, --- F. Supp. 2d ---,
2010 WL 4860299, No. 6:10-cv-00015-nkm (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010), appeal
docketed, No. 10-2347 (4th Cir. Dec. 3, 2010).
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5health care, and the requirements of Section 1501 assure that all Americans who
can afford it contribute to the costs of their own health care by maintaining
reasonable insurance coverage. Without it, those costs will be borne by those who
buy insurance or by the taxpayers. As Massachusetts Governor Romney noted
when signing the Massachusetts equivalent of Section 1501:
Some of my libertarian friends balk at what looks like an
individual mandate. But remember, someone has to pay
for the health care that must, by law, be provided: Either
the individual pays or the taxpayers pay. A free ride on
the government is not libertarian.9
Amici also show why confirming Congress’ power to enact Section 1501
will not result in the vast expansion of federal power of concern to the court below.
The health care market is characterized by five unique factors -- the unavoidable
need for medical care; the unpredictability of such need; the high cost of care; the
inability of providers to refuse to provide care in emergency situations; and the
very significant cost-shifting that underlies the way medical care is paid for in this
country -- which do not obtain in other markets. Without these factors, the need
for provisions such as those adopted in Section 1501 is absent. Congress can fully
address collective actions by individuals that affect interstate commerce through
less intrusive requirements. However, reform of the health care and health care
9 Mitt Romney, Health Care for Everyone? We Found A Way, The Wall Street
Journal, Apr. 11, 2006, p. A16, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114472206077422547.html/mod=opinion_main_c
ommentaries.
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6insurance markets is dependent on spreading the costs of health care across as
much of the consuming public as possible. That requirement does not exist in any
of the other markets identified by the District Court or the Appellees. Contrary to
the District-Court’s assertion, affirming Congress’ power to adopt Section 1501
will not open the door to unfettered federal encroachment upon individual liberty
or the police powers of the States.
ARGUMENT
The District Court held that the individual mandate to acquire health
insurance under Section 1501 exceeds the permissible scope of federal power by
requiring that individuals engage in a prescribed form of economic activity.10
Notably, the Court found that Section 1501 exceeds the boundaries of
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause by extending federal
regulation beyond economic activity to reach inactivity.11
Rooted in this purported distinction between activity and inactivity, the
Court asserted that upholding the constitutionality of the ACA will provide the
legal foundation for creating expansive national power that a future Congress may
use to regulate nearly anything. 12 Notwithstanding solid case law confirming the
10 Florida ex rel. Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *41.
11 See id. at *22 (“It would be a radical departure from existing case law to hold
that Congress can regulate inactivity under the Commerce Clause.”).
12 See id. at *29 (“To now hold that Congress may regulate the so-called ‘economic
decision’ to not purchase a product or service in anticipation of future consumption
is … without logical limitation and far exceeds the existing legal boundaries
Footnote continued on next page
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7breadth of congressional power to regulate when necessary and appropriate to
achieve an objective within its powers under the Commerce Clause, the District
Court concluded that Congress lacked the power to require individuals to purchase
health insurance. It reached that conclusion on the grounds, inter alia, that
Congress had never attempted to regulate inactivity under the Commerce Clause
and that establishing a relationship between the failure to acquire insurance and
interstate commerce required “piling ‘inference on inference’”.13
The fundamental flaw with the District Court’s analysis of Section 1501 is
that it relies on a false distinction between economic activity and inactivity.14
Although the decision to forego insurance has the superficial appearance of
inaction, it is, from an economic perspective, merely an act of choosing a preferred
method for paying anticipated medical costs during a particular period of time. It
is also an act that substantially affects the cost of health care for other individuals
and the overall operation of the interstate health care and health insurance markets.
Footnote continued from previous page
established by Supreme Court precedent.”); see also Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli,
728 F. Supp. at 788 (“The unchecked expansion of congressional power to the
limits suggested by the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision would invite
unbridled exercise of federal police powers.”)
13 Florida ex rel. Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *27.
14 We have not been able to find any express support for this distinction in a
Supreme Court decision and none has been cited by Appellees or the District
Court. To the extent address, precedent indicates that there is no such distinction.
Cf. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring)(When considering something from a legislative
perspective, it should be the outcome that is important, as “the intelligent line does
not fall between action and inaction.”)
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 04/11/2011     Page: 38 of 63
8Section 1501 is a tailored response to these circumstances, assuring that all who
can afford it bear a share of the medical expenses they will inevitably demand,
rather than merely imposing the costs largely or entirely on others. Spreading the
escalating costs of health care among all who will use it is essential to achieving
Congress’ legitimate goal of regulating those costs, which constitute more than one
sixth of the nation’s gross domestic product. Consequently, the underlying
economics of the health care market clearly justify Congress’ adoption of Section
1501.15
I. The Unique Economics of the Health Care Industry Make the Minimum
Coverage Provision Necessary
Economists have long recognized that health care has unique characteristics
not found in other markets. Indeed, health care violates almost all of the
requirements for markets to yield first best outcomes (termed “Pareto
optimality”).16 One requirement for market optimality is that people know what
they need, and that they have full information about how to obtain it. In medical
care, in contrast, need is unpredictable and information -- particularly about the
costs of medical treatment -- is much less than complete. Second, optimality
15 See Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 2010 WL 4860299, at *15 (“Far from ‘inactivity,’
by choosing to forgo insurance, Plaintiffs are making an economic decision to try
to pay for health care services later, out of pocket, rather than now, through the
purchase of insurance.”); see also Mead v. Holder, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, 2011 WL
611139, Civ. No. 10-950 (GK), at *15-16 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011); Thomas More
Law Center, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 894.
16 Kenneth Arrow, “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care,”
American Economic Review, 53(5), December 1963, p. 941-973; N. Gregory
Mankiw, Principles of Economics, 5th Edition, New York: South-Western, 2009.
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9requires that individuals’ actions affect only themselves. This is again not true in
medical care, where an individual’s actions have effects far beyond themselves --
both directly (by spreading communicable diseases, for example) and indirectly
(by not being insured and thus shifting costs to others, for example).
Optimality in a market also requires vigorous competition on the part of
providers. Because of the uncertainty about medical care, however, we impose a
variety of constraints on medical care providers, including licensing requirements
and regulation of the provider-patient relationship. Structural factors in the
markets for health care, such as the limited number of hospitals and primary care
physicians, also are inconsistent with perfect competition. As a result of these
market failures, economists do not approach the health care industry with
anywhere near the deference to individual choice or the expectations of optimality
that they do in other markets.
These market failures are the foundation for the field of health economics
and have been an object of study for decades. The paper that launched the field
nearly a half century ago notes that “[T]he failure of the market to insure against
uncertainties has created many social institutions in which the usual assumptions of
the market are to some extent contradicted. The medical profession is only one
example, though in many respects an extreme one.”17 That remains true today.
17 Arrow, supra n.16, at 967.
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Of particular relevance to this case, economists who have studied health care
and health insurance for many decades have concluded that it is incorrect to say
that people who do not purchase health insurance do not participate in or affect the
markets for medical care and health insurance. Rather, all participate in the
markets for medical services and necessarily affect the market for health insurance.
This conclusion revolves around three observations:
A. People cannot avoid medical care with certainty, or be sure that they
can pay for the costs of care if uninsured.
Everyone gets sick or suffers an injury at some point in life. When they do,
they generally need medical care. Further, sickness, and especially injury, is often
unforeseen. People need medical care because of accidents, because of life
situations beyond their control (e.g., cancer, a mental health emergency), because
events turn out different from expected (e.g., chronic care medications fail to stem
a disease), or because of the normal aging process (e.g., joint replacement,
Alzheimer’s disease, congestive heart failure). Thus, even if people do not intend
to use medical care, they often use it anyway. According to tabulations from the
Medical Expenditure Panel Study, the leading source of data on national medical
spending, 57 percent of the 40 million people uninsured in all of 2007 used
medical services that year.18 By another metric, even the best risk adjustment
18 Agency for Health Care Quality and Research, Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey, Summary Data Tables, Table 1.
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systems used to predict medical spending explain only 25 to 35 percent of the
variation in the costs different individuals incur; 19 the vast bulk of spending needs
cannot be forecast in advance.
Moreover, because medical care is so expensive, essentially everyone must
have some access to funds beyond their own resources in order to afford it. In
2007, the average person used $6,186 in personal health care services,20 which is
over 10 percent of the median family’s income that year and over 20 percent of the
median family’s financial assets.21 Even routine medical procedures, such as
MRIs, CT scans, colonoscopies, mammograms, and childbirth, to name a few, cost
more than many Americans can afford.
Those suffering from many common, but costly, medical problems spend
substantially more. For example, medical costs in the year after a colorectal cancer
diagnosis average $25,000, even before expensive new medications;22 pancreatic
cancer costs about $57,000;23 and treatment of a heart attack for 90 days cost over
19 Ross Winkelman and Syed Mahmud, A Comparative Analysis of Claims-Based
Tools for Health Risk Assessment, Society of Actuaries, 2007.
20 Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, National Health Expenditure
Accounts. Homes are not counted toward one’s “financial assets.”
21 Brian K. Bucks, Arthur B. Kennickell, Traci L. Mach, and Kevin B. Moore,
“Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2004 to 2007: Evidence from the Survey
of Consumer Finances,” Survey of Current Business, February 2009, A2-A56.
22 K. Robin Yabroff, Elizabeth B. Lamont, Angela Mariotto, Joan L. Warren,
Marie Topor, Angela Meekins, Martin L. Brown, “Costs of Care for Elderly
Cancer Patients in the United States,” Journal of the National Cancer Institute,
100(9), 2008, 630-641.
23 Id.
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$20,000 in 1998.24 All told, ranking everyone on the basis of medical spending,
including those who did not use any care, the costs for the top 1% of that
distribution equaled $85,000 on average. 25 This amount is 46 percent above
median family income and nearly three times the financial assets of the median
family. Indeed, this amount -- $85,000 -- exceeds the total financial assets of all
but the very well-to-do.26 Thus, it is very difficult for anyone to commit to paying
for medical care on their own, and only the exceptionally wealthy can even
consider doing so.
The combination of the uncertainty of need and the high cost of care when
needed highlights the fundamental distinction that health economists make
between health insurance and medical care. Medical care is the set of services that
make one healthier, or prevent deterioration in health. Health insurance is a
mechanism for spreading the costs of that medical care across people or over time,
from a period when the cost would be overwhelming to periods when costs are
more manageable. The decision to regulate health insurance is not based on any
normative view about the benefits of medical care for any particular person.
24 David M. Cutler and Mark McClellan, “Is Technological Change in Medicine
Worth It?”, Health Affairs, 20(5), September/October 2001, 11-29.
25 Kaiser Family Foundation, Trends in Health Care Costs and Spending, March
2009; Agency for Health Care Quality and Research, Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey, Summary Data Tables, Table 1.
26 Bucks et al., supra, n.21 at A27. This study reports that the median value of the
direct and indirect stock holdings of all families with income below but the 90th
percentage was $62,000 in 2007. Indirect stock holdings include pooled
investment trusts, retirement accounts and other managed accounts.
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B. Other legislation mandates access to a minimum level of health care
for all who seek it, even those who cannot pay.
Existing federal legislation requires care to be provided to the very sick,
even if they cannot pay for it. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act
(“EMTALA”)27 mandates that hospitals that take Medicare, and virtually all do,
stabilize patients who come to their emergency rooms with emergency conditions
without regard to whether they can pay for the care they need. Long before
EMTALA, most hospitals provided this charity care as part of their mission.28
This tradition of assuring the availability of some minimal level of treatment to all
Americans without regard to ability to pay reflects a collective decision that we
are, as a Nation, generally unwilling to see others come to great harm for lack of
access to medical care.
There are many other respects in which the special nature of health care
justifies imposing unique restrictions on private actors in the health care system.
Because medical care is not an ordinary commodity, physicians owe their patient a
duty29 and are not free to contract over the terms of treatment in the same manner
27 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.
28 Charles Rosenberg, The Care of Strangers: The Rise of America’s Hospital
System, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1995; David Rosner, A Once Charitable
Enterprise: Hospitals and Health Care in Brooklyn and New York 1885-1915,
Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1982; Rosemary Stevens, In Sickness and in
Wealth: American Hospitals in the Twentieth Century, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins,
1999.
29 See Jill R. Horwitz, The Multiple Common Law Roots of Charitable Immunity:
An Essay in Honor of Richard Epstein’s Contributions to Tort Law, J. Tort L., Jan.
2010, at 29-33.
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as other buyers and sellers.30 For example, medical care providers must ensure that
their patients are informed before they give consent to their treatment.
Additionally, physicians are bound under a common law duty not to abandon their
patients once a physician-patient relationship is established. The physician has an
obligation to provide care throughout an episode of illness and may not terminate
the relationship unless certain restrictive conditions are met, including that either
the patient fires the physician or the physician gives the patient sufficient notice
and opportunity to find alternate, sufficient treatment. 31 These requirements for
severing the physician-patient relationship apply even if the patient cannot pay for
his care.32
These obligations to provide medical care without regard to ability to pay
necessarily impose costs that must be borne by others, either through taxes or
through cost shifting that increases the costs for those who are able to pay, whether
personally or through insurance. Economists variously term these induced costs an
30 See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of California, 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441
(1963) (finding that even though a patient may understand the significance of a
contract releasing a hospital from potential liability in exchange for medical care,
hospitals may not benefit from these exculpatory clauses because of the special
way in which health care affects the public interest).
31 See, e.g., Saunders v. Lischkoff, 137 Fla. 826, 836, 188 So. 815, 819 (1939)
(noting that the obligation of continuing treatment can only be terminated “by the
cessation of the necessity which gave rise to the relation of physician and patient,
or by the discharge of the physician by the patient, or by the physician’s
withdrawing from the case, after giving the proper notice.” ). Accord, e.g., Lewis
v. Capalbo, 280 A.D.2d 257, 820 N.Y.S.2d 455 (2001); Magana v. Elie, 108 Ill.
App.3d 1028, 439 N.E.2d 1319 (1982).
32 See, e.g., Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208 (Utah 1937) (finding that the doctor did
not give sufficient notice to allow his patient to procure other medical attention).
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externality (a situation where one person’s actions or inactions affects others), a
free-rider problem (where people buy a good and leave the costs to others), or a
Samaritan’s dilemma (where people choose not to be prepared for emergencies,
knowing that others will care for them if needed). Even basic economics textbooks
stress that externalities require government intervention to improve the functioning
of the market.33
C. Whether one person buys health insurance has cost implications for
everyone else.
Economists universally recognize that the time dimension is a key part of
individual decision-making. For most goods and services, the moment of purchase
is different from the moment of consumption (purchase almost always precedes
consumption). Thus, the decision to forgo insurance cannot be separated from the
consequences of being without insurance, and no economic model treats them as
separate. The consequences are three-fold. First, the decision not to purchase
insurance may inevitably be followed by becoming ill, and thus using care
financed by others. Second, people may forgo preventive care while uninsured
(such as a mammogram or colonoscopy) and spend more later (for example, when
diagnosed with advanced cancer). Third, people may only receive partial care
33 N. Gregory Mankiw, supra n.16.
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when they are uninsured and sick, and then use more care when they become
insured.34
In each of these circumstances, being uninsured imposes costs on others.
These consequences show -- in stark contrast to the District Court’s opinion -- that
the “mere status of being without health insurance” does have real and significant
impacts on interstate commerce far different from an individual who lacks other
types of insurance or is without other goods.35 Because medical care is so
expensive, particularly when people are very sick, and medical care providers are
required to care for sick people, the cost of people choosing to be without coverage
are necessarily shared with others. The medical care used by each uninsured
person costs about $2,000 per year, on average. Only 35 to 38 percent of this total
is paid for by the uninsured directly in out-of-pocket payments.36
The remainder is financed in several ways. Thirty-two percent of the total is
paid for by providers charging higher prices to the insured, as providers “cost
34 The District Court was thus incorrect in its five-step analysis for when an
uninsured individual would have a “substantial effect on interstate commerce.”
See Florida ex rel. Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *26. An uninsured person need not
seek medical assistance at the time of a single complication to create current and
future impacts on the interstate market.
35 Id. (stating that those without health insurance have “no impact whatsoever” on
interstate commerce, or at least no more than being without any other good or
service).
36 Agency for Health Care Quality and Research, Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey, Summary Data Tables, Table 1; Jack Hadley, John Holahan, Teresa
Coughlin and Dawn Miller, “Covering the Uninsured in 2008: Current Costs,
Sources of Payment, and Incremental Costs,” Health Affairs, 27(5), 2008, w399-
w415, et al.
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shift” 37 from the uninsured to the insured. The total amount of cost shifting is over
$40 billion per year, and the increase in private insurance premiums resulting from
this cost shifting has been estimated at between 1.7 percent38 and 8.4 percent.39
Another 14 percent of the costs of the uninsured are paid for by government,
through Medicare and Medicaid payments, and services used through the VA,
TriCare (medical insurance for the military and their families), and workers’
compensation. Higher government costs attributable to the uninsured are
implicitly paid for by the insured as well, through increased taxes or reductions in
other government services as money is spent on the uninsured. Finally, the
remaining costs are generally either borne by the health-care providers or covered
by philanthropic contributions to hospitals and other medical providers.
Moreover, even people who are able to avoid using medical care when they
are without health insurance affect the amount paid by others, in two separate
ways. First, when some, relatively healthier people, refrain from buying health
insurance, that raises the premiums of the people who wish to purchase insurance,
a phenomenon termed “adverse selection.” Second, when people who were
previously uninsured for a period of time do obtain coverage, they tend to consume
more care and result in greater costs to the system.
37 Hadley, et al., supra note 36.
38 Id.
39 Families USA, “Paying a Premium”, Washington, D.C.: Families USA, July
2005.
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This adverse selection causes the premiums for health insurance to increase
as a result of a smaller and less healthy pool of insured persons. The increase in
premium costs also causes additional people -- many of whom are healthy -- to opt
out of the market, raising prices even higher. The end result of this process of
individuals opting-out or waiting to purchase health insurance will be significantly
lower coverage, and possibly an unraveling of the market as a whole, what is
widely termed an adverse selection “death spiral.”40
In most states, insurers attempt to counter adverse selection by
discriminating against the ill, through denials of coverage or exclusion of pre-
existing conditions. Yet, as noted, all of us are at risk for becoming ill and needing
medical care. An insurance market that encourages insurers to exclude people
when sick denies people a fundamental element of insurance, reducing the
economic benefits of insurance substantially.
Unfortunately, simply removing these tools from the reach of insurance
companies does not solve the problem; insurers react by raising prices for all
market participants to guard themselves against losses from selling only to the sick.
Several states have tried mandating coverage of individuals with pre-existing
conditions, non-discrimination in insurance pricing, and other similar reforms of
40 David M. Cutler and Sarah Reber, “Paying for Health Insurance: The Trade-off
between Competition and Adverse Selection,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
113(2), 1998, 433-466.
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their markets for individuals’ policies, but without the equivalent of a minimum
coverage requirement. All of these State experiments have failed and are among
the most expensive states in which to buy non-group insurance.41
And, uninsured people have been shown to incur greater health care costs
when they become insured, as a result of their having been uninsured. People who
are uninsured often have delayed access to primary, preventive, and chronic care
and thus become sicker over time.42 When acute illness occurs, they may be
insured through public or private insurance, thus increasing the amount that those
programs spend. For example, Medicare beneficiaries who were uninsured prior to
becoming eligible for Medicare used 51 percent more services than those who
were insured prior to Medicare eligibility.43 These costs are largely paid for by
people who are insured, who pay higher taxes for Medicare when they are
working, pay higher premiums for Part B coverage when they are enrolled in
Medicare, or receive fewer government services because of the higher cost of
Medicare.
41 Jonathan Gruber and Sara Rosenbaum, “Buying Health Care, The Individual
Mandate, and the Constitution,” New England Journal of Medicine, 2010;
363:401-403.
42 Committee on the Consequences of Uninsurance, Institute of Medicine, Health
Insurance is a Family Matter 106 (2002).
43 J. Michael McWilliams, Ellen Meara, Alan M. Zaslavsky, and John Z. Ayanian,
“Use of Health Services by Previously Uninsured Medicare Beneficiaries,” New
England Journal of Medicine 2007; 357:143-153.
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The only economic solution to this dilemma is to ensure broad participation
in insurance pools by all people. The minimum coverage requirement is one way
to do this.
II. Upholding Section 1501 Will Not Give Congress Unfettered Power to
Impose New Mandates on Individuals
A. Health Care Characteristics Distinguish It From Other Markets.
The unique characteristics of health care described in the preceding section
also demonstrate why upholding the minimum coverage provision will not lead
ineluctably to equivalent federal interventions in other markets. The combination
of the unavoidable need for medical care; the unpredictability of such need; the
high cost of care, which in many situations far outstrips an individual’s or family’s
ability to pay; the fact that providers cannot refuse to provide care in emergency
situations, and generally will not in many other situations; and the very significant
cost-shifting that underlies the way medical care is paid for in this country,
cumulatively combine to create a set of conditions and needs that do not exist in
other contexts.
As the District Court noted, there are clearly other situations in which
spreading the cost of a government program across more citizens would ease the
burden on some. In light of the Government’s financial support for General
Motors (“GM”), taxpayers might benefit if citizens were required to buy GM cars.
However, an individual’s decision not to buy a GM car does not increase the cost
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borne by others. When an individual buys a car, he or she bears the full cost. This
hypothetical contrasts sharply with the case of uninsured individuals either
receiving uncompensated care or engaging in “market timing” behavior where they
only pay for insurance when they plan on using medical care or recognize that their
medical costs are escalating, thereby inevitably shifting costs to insured
individuals.
Likewise, while there are other necessities of life, such as food and shelter,
they too do not have the economic characteristics of health care. Because the need
for most items is relatively certain in amount and time, people do not insure against
the risk that they will need food or shelter. Rather, they plan for those needs, even
when their means are limited. Nor are grocery stores or landlords required to
provide food or housing to the needy even if they cannot afford to pay. So too,
while many families purchase homes, purchasing a home is discretionary decision
as living quarters can be rented. And, banks can adjust for the risks of non-
payment, and government intervention is unnecessary to address the concerns
raised by the Court.44
44 See Florida ex rel. Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *24. The District Court’s
analogizing medical costs and risks to mortgage financing is a strain, at best. The
economics of the housing market are fundamentally different from those involved
in health care and the recent crisis in the financial markets was largely attributable
to unacceptable risk-taking by mortgagors and others in the financial markets. See,
e.g., FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE
FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES xxvii-xx (2011),
Footnote continued on next page
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In contrast, virtually all will require health care at some point, medical
providers are obligated to provide care, and the costs of much medical care --
especially the most-costly care -- occur unpredictably. These expenses cannot be
deferred nor can care be provided in other ways. Rather, the costs are largely
borne by others when incurred by an uninsured party.
The District Court’s attempt to equate these other necessities with the health
care market ignores the totality of the unique characteristics of the health care
market. None of the hypothetical situations discussed in its decision involves
unavoidable need, unpredictable need, unpredictable costs, the obligation to
provide service, and the cost shifting that characterizes the health care market.
Indeed, the costs associated with many of the markets discussed by the Court are
not typically financed by insurance where the risks are shared by others.
Consequently, the assumption underlying the Court’s decision -- that Section 1501
regulates inactivity -- is unsustainable: individuals who forego health insurance are
not bystanders, but are participants in and dramatically affect both the health
insurance and health care markets.
B. The Decision to Forego Health Care Is Not A Passive Decision.
A large number of studies in health economics show that insurance decisions
respond to economic factors in a manner strongly predicted by models of forward-
Footnote continued from previous page
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. It was
not the result of the inherent economic characteristics of the market.
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looking behavior, and thus that many individuals forgo insurance as a result of
strategic thinking. One finding supporting this view is that about one-quarter of
the uninsured reject the offer of employer-sponsored insurance to remain
uninsured, despite the significant subsidies that virtually all employers offer for
employer-sponsored insurance.45 Insurance purchase is not a random event; it
responds strongly to price and other factors. Other studies show that individuals
are more likely to remain uninsured when there are more sources of
“uncompensated care” available, such as public hospitals or hospitals that have
high uncompensated care spending; the ability to receive free care plays into the
decision to be covered.46
Still other studies show that when public insurance is expanded to some
family members, such as children, families will often drop insurance for all
members of the family to take advantage of the partial coverage for children. This
exposes the ineligible family members to being uninsured but leads to overall
benefits for the family.47 Finally, evidence from Massachusetts shows that even
under the insurance mandate there, some people signed up for insurance but
45Gruber, Jonathan and Ebonya Washington (2005). Subsidies to Employee Health
Insurance Premiums and the Health Insurance Market, Journal of Health
Economics, 24(2), March 2005, p. 253-276.
46 Rask, Kevin N. and Kimberly J. Rask (2000). “Public Insurance Substituting for
Private Insurance: New Evidence Regarding Public Hospitals, Uncompensated
Care Funds, and Medicaid”.
47 David Cutler and Jonathan Gruber (1996). The Effect of Expanding the
Medicaid Program on Public Insurance, Private Insurance, and Redistribution,
American Economic Review, 86(2), May 1996, p. 368-373.
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terminated their coverage within a year; such individuals were much sicker than
the typical person in the market.48 The costs of this “adverse selection” were
estimated to increase insurance premiums by 0.5 to 1.5%, and ending this loophole
-- which Massachusetts has done with the Affordable Care Act -- would lower
costs for everyone in the market by 1.2%. This data demonstrates that foregoing
health insurance is frequently not “inactivity,” as the District Court believed, but
an affirmative, rational economic decision.
C. The Decision to Forego Health Care Insurance Directly Affects
Interstate Commerce.
Contrary to the Court’s apparent assertion, 49 the decision to forego health
insurance has a profound impact on interstate commerce. The data in the record
here and before Congress clearly establish that the collective effect of individual
decisions not to purchase health insurance have a profound effect on the costs of
health care insurance premiums, the coverage which insurance companies can
provide at reasonable rates, and the extent to which the costs of providing health
care to the uninsured are borne by others, including the taxpayer. As the District
Court recognized, the total costs of uncompensated care in 2008 alone were $43
48 Oliver Wyman (2010). “Analysis of Individual Health Coverage in
Massachusetts Before and After the July 1, 2007 Merger of the Small Group and
Nongroup Health Insurance Markets,” available at
http://www.mass.gov/Eoca/docs/doi/Companies/adverse_selection_report.pdf.
49 Florida ex rel. Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *26.
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billion.50 And, as the experience in Massachusetts noted above demonstrates,
decisions by individuals to opt out of a health insurance program increases the
costs of health insurance to others.
Further, the Court’s conclusion that five steps are necessary for the decision
to forego purchasing health insurance to affect interstate commerce51 overlooks the
characteristics of the health care market. For example, medical conditions often
get worse over time and ignoring them at the early stages increases the ultimate
cost of treating the condition. Thus, an individual may forgo preventive care when
uninsured and, as a result, his or her medical costs are higher later when the
condition is addressed. The decision to forego medical care imposes costs on
others, contrary to the District Court’s holding. The same is true with some types
of curative care. One may forgo such care today if they are sick, but use more of
that care in the future, when once they get coverage. Thus, the District Court’s
reliance on Lopez’s52 prohibition against “piling ‘inference upon inference’” is
misplaced.53 The record developed by Congress establishes that the decision not to
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995),
53 See Florida ex rel. Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *26 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at
567); but see Thomas More Law Center, 720 F. Supp. 2d at 894 (“This … cost-
shifting is what makes the health care market unique. Far from ‘inactivity,’ by
choosing to forgo insurance plaintiffs are making an economic decision … to pay
for health care services later,… rather than now through the purchase of insurance,
collectively shifting billions of dollars, $43 billion in 2008, onto other market
participants. As this cost-shifting is exactly what the Health Care Reform Act was
Footnote continued on next page
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purchase health insurance when writ large against the public as a whole has a
direct and immediate impact on interstate commerce.
Several district courts have agreed with these findings and their implications,
recognizing that the ACA is designed to address failures in the health care
insurance market that make it prohibitively difficult for many individuals to afford
or obtain health insurance and produce escalating health care costs for consumers
and taxpayers.54 The decision to require most individuals who can afford it to
obtain health insurance is a reasonable approach, as a matter of economics, to
satisfying the ACA’s overarching goals in reforming health insurance and creating
a fairer and more efficient health care system.55 The economic characteristics and
principles that underlie this conclusion are, however, not common to other
markets. In short, Section 1501 is a measured response to a unique market
imperfection arising from characteristics that do not exist in other markets.
Upholding that necessary corrective measure will not open the floodgates of
unfettered federal power to require individuals to purchase goods and services or
engage in activity that may be good for them.
Footnote continued from previous page
enacted to address, there is no need for metaphysical gymnastics of the sort
proscribed by Lopez.”).
54 Liberty Univ., 2010 WL 4860299, at *14-15; Thomas More Law Center, 720 F.
Supp. 2d at 894-95.
55 See, J. Gruber, Health Care Reform without the Individual Mandate, Center for
American Progress (Feb. 2011), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/02/gruber_mandate.html.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Amici urge the Court to reverse the decision
below and uphold Section 1501. Spreading the costs of medical care across the
broad spectrum of the population that will require medical assistance is essential to
reforming the health care system in the United States and achieving the legitimate
goals of the Act. While the minimum coverage requirement may appear unique, it
is, as an economic matter, consistent with the other obligations imposed under the
Commerce Clause. As Judge Moon of the Western District of Virginia held, it is a
regulation of “economic decisions … [that have] a substantial impact on the
national market for health care ….”56 Given the unique economic characteristics
of health care, upholding that requirement will not authorize a vast expansion of
federal power.
56 Liberty Univ., 2010 WL 4860299, at *15; accord Mead v. Holder, 2011 WL
611139, at *15-16 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011); Thomas More Law Center, 720 F.
Supp. 2d at 894.
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